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ABSTRACT
Resiliency is the ability of large-scale high-performance computing
(HPC) applications to gracefully handle errors, and recover from
failures. In this paper, we propose a pattern-based approach to
constructing resilience solutions that handle multiple error modes.
Using resilience patterns, we evaluate the performance and reli-
ability characteristics of detection, containment and mitigation
techniques for transient errors that cause silent data corruptions
and techniques for fail-stop errors that result in process failures. We
demonstrate the design and implementation of the multiresilience
solution based on patterns instantiated across multiple layers of
the system stack. The patterns are integrated to work together to
achieve resiliency to different error types in a performance-efficient
manner.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Resiliency solutions provide capabilities for high-performance com-
puting (HPC) applications to deal with the effects of different types
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of errors, and recover from failures. Resiliency is becoming an
increasingly important attribute for HPC systems and their ap-
plications, as systems of unprecedented scale and complexity are
designed and deployed for running advanced scientific simulation,
modeling, big-data analysis and machine learning applications. The
continuous occurrence of faults is typical on the fastest supercom-
puting systems today due to reduction in reliability of individual
system components caused by shrinking process technology, and
operation at low voltage. As a consequence of these disturbing
trends, and the growing complexity of the architectures and the
software environment of HPC systems, future extreme-scale sys-
tems are projected to encounter frequent, persistent and erratic
errors of different types [4]. Therefore, the development of com-
prehensive resiliency solutions is critical to deliver sustained high
performance for scientific applications.
Many of the resilience solutions in use today are designed to
support a specific fault model. However, fault analyses indicate that
modern HPC systems experience multiple types of error events
with different levels of severity in terms of the application’s ability
to produce a correct solution and their impact on performance.
Transient errors that cause silent data corruptions in the application
state may result in outcomes ranging from loss in precision to
wildly incorrect results. Unrecoverable errors often result in fail-
stop behavior, which is fatal for the application program. Therefore,
HPC applications require multiresilience solutions that provide
comprehensive protection against multiple modes of errors. These
solutions must be constructed systematically through integration of
various techniques to detect and gracefully handle the error events
without sacrificing application performance.
In this paper, we demonstrate a performance-oriented approach
to the design and implementation of software-based multiresilience
solutions. We leverage resilience design patterns, which we devel-
oped in previous work [11], to identify and evaluate techniques for
detection, containment and mitigation for specific error modes. We
explore an implementation of the complete multiresilience solution,
in which patterns are instantiated across multiple layers of the
system stack and work together to achieve required levels of per-
formance and resiliency. The pattern-based approach also enables
global optimization of the solution, avoiding costly over-protection
and emphasizing end-to-end application performance. With this
approach, we make the following significant contributions:
• We demonstrate a novel approach based on resilience de-
sign patterns that systematically explores techniques with
different performance and reliability characteristics, and en-
ables the design of comprehensive multiresilience solutions
through composition of patterns.
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• We design a cross-layer multiresilience solution from con-
ception to implementation using patterns for linear solver
methods. The solution is implemented by instantiating algo-
rithmic patterns to work in concert with patterns incorpo-
rated in the message-passing layer of a parallel application.
• We present a detailed experimental evaluation of our pattern-
based solution that assesses the interdependencies between
patterns for hard and soft errors, and characterizes the per-
formance of the complete multiresilience solution.
2 BACKGROUND: DESIGN PATTERNS FOR
RESILIENCE
Design patterns describe a generalizable solution to a recurring
problem that occurs within a well-defined context. Many of the
HPC resilience solutions in use today are based on a fixed set of
techniques that are repeatedly found in various solutions.Wemined
existing solutions, which have been used in HPC environments to
confront faults, errors and failures, to discover patterns [11].
Each resilience design pattern consists of a set of activation and
response interfaces, and a behavior specification, which describes
the semantics of how the pattern handles a fault event and its con-
sequences. While the patterns are not finished designs that can be
transformed into code, they outline the strategies for detecting a
fault, error, or a failure, limiting its propagation, and mitigating its
impact through recovery or masking. Therefore, discrete implemen-
tations of the same pattern may have different levels of performance
and reliability characteristics. We presented the resilience design
patterns in a catalog [10], which organizes the patterns in a layered
hierarchy. Based on the insight that HPC resilience has two impor-
tant aspects, namely the forward progress of an application and
the consistency and fidelity of an application’s data, the catalog
broadly categorizes patterns into state and behavioral patterns.
2.1 State Patterns
The state patterns describe the protection domain of a resilience
solution. These patterns encapsulate the particular aspects of an
application’s state. The careful scoping of the protection domain
enables defining the resilience behavior in a modular fashion for
the specific domain captured by the state pattern. The selection
of the state pattern also helps define the containment scope, i.e.,
the scope of how far a fault or error event propagates. The state
patterns have been classified into: (1) Static State pattern, which
encapsulates the application data that is computed once in the ini-
tialization phase and is unchanged thereafter, (2) Dynamic State
pattern, which describes the changing application state as the ap-
plication progresses, (3) Environment State pattern, which includes
the state necessary to perform the computation, i.e., program code,
environment variables, libraries, etc, and (4) Stateless pattern, which
defines null state, enabling designers to create solutions that define
behavior without predefined scope.
2.2 Behavioral Patterns
The behavioral patterns identify common detection, containment,
mitigation techniques that enable an application or the system that
instantiates and implements these patterns to cope with the pres-
ence of fault, error, or failure events. These patterns have been
classified hierarchically describing solutions from abstract to con-
crete. The categories include: (1) Strategy patterns, which describe
high-level solutions for fault treatment, error or failure recovery
and compensation. (2) Architecture patterns, which convey specific
methods necessary for the construction of a resilience solution.
These patterns are a sub-class to the strategy patterns. Both the
architecture and strategy patterns are organized by the types of
event (fault, error or failure) they handle and the specific actions
taken to handle an event. (3) Structural patterns, which provide
concrete description of a solution that is intended to guide the
implementation of the resilience solution. These patterns describe
specific solutions for fault monitoring and prediction, the forward
and backward checkpoint recovery, and patterns that describe the
specific ways of applying the redundancy approaches.
3 PATTERN-BASED MODELING OF
MULTIRESILIENCE SOLUTIONS
Among the difficult challenges that face HPC application devel-
opers and system designers is the emergence of different types of
errors caused by intermittent or permanent faults, gradual degrada-
tion and system aging related effects. Naïvely stacking multiple re-
silience solutions often leads to overprotection, and is exorbitantly
expensive in terms of the overhead to application performance,
since each solution for each fault types imposes its own overhead.
In order for applications to harness the capabilities of modern
extreme-scale HPC systems, comprehensive resilience solutions
must be designed and implemented thoughtfully and methodically.
In this section, we explore the construction of multiresilience
solutions for HPC applications using the resilience design patterns
to guide the selection of techniques for detection, containment and
mitigation, and for optimization of the protection domain and over-
all application performance. As a case study, we choose an iterative
linear solver since such solver methods are at the heart of most
scientific simulation and modeling applications. Our design of a
multiresilience solution aims to address two of the most prevalent
fault models in modern HPC systems, including transient errors
that result in silent data corruptions (SDCs) and unrecoverable
errors, which in the context of parallel applications based on com-
municating processes tends to be fatal causing failure of the entire
application. The scope of this work is limited to faults which affect
application correctness or completion, and does not include faults
which explicitly affect performance, such as due to a slow parallel
file system, a congested network, a code bug during application
development, etc.
The patterns in our catalog [10] each have significantly differ-
ent performance efficiency and complexity characteristics. There-
fore, we quantitatively evaluate their viability for our context. The
complete design of the multiresilience solution entails combining
the selected patterns and optimizing their interactions to ensure
complete protection to both error types while delivering greater
end-to-end application performance.
3.1 Patterns for Soft Error (SE) Detection and
Mitigation
Soft errors that cause SDCs affect the convergence properties of a
linear solver method. A typical linear solver method solves a system
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of equations of the form Ax = b, in which the matrix A and right
hand side vector b are known, and we solve to determine vector x .
When affected by SDCs during the solution phase, the corruption
may cause unbounded numerical errors in the outcome, slower
convergence to solution, or the premature termination of the solver.
However, application specific knowledge about the data structures
and the algorithm used is required to detect SDCs in the solver and
mitigate their effects.
State Patterns for SE resilience: In the linear solver, the operand
matrix A and right hand side vector b are initialized during the
setup and remain unchanged throughout the computation. There-
fore, variables A and b are encapsulated in static state patterns. The
solution vector x is updated as the solver makes progress, until
the linear solver converges. The remainder of the variables, which
includes matrix index structures, pointers, loop counters, etc, are
included in an environment state pattern. The separation of the
linear solver state into these distinct state patterns enables the ex-
ploration of different behavioral patterns for detection and recovery
that leverage the properties of each state pattern.
SE Detection Patterns: For detecting the presence of SDCs in
application state encapsulated by the static state patterns, the be-
havioral patterns may take advantage of the invariance property of
this state from initialization until the solver converges. Between the
behavioral strategy patterns that offer recovery and compensation,
the latter is more suitable based on the insight that the protection
domain is contained in a static pattern, and therefore the redundant
information required for detection is also computed at initialization.
In contrast, the recovery behavioral pattern incurs the overhead
of preserving a checkpoint of its protection domain at periodic
intervals, which in the case of a static state pattern is unnecessary.
For the solver’s protection domain contained in the dynamic state
pattern, the detection of SDCs requires insight into the changing
nature of the dynamic state, which is a capability supported by
the diagnosis pattern, and specifically the monitoring pattern. This
pattern uses cause-effect analysis to infer the presence of faults
or errors. For the linear solver application employing an iterative
algorithm, the residual error in the solution indicates how close the
solver is from a correct solution.
An alternative pattern for detection of SDC that we considered is
the compensation pattern, which is realized as a n-modular pattern.
However, SDC detection using this pattern requires at least 2x
computation and consumes additional communication bandwidth
at large-scale resulting in high performance overheads.
SE Mitigation Patterns: The patterns for mitigating the im-
pact of SDCs on the linear solver application seek to ensure that
the solver converges to a correct solution despite SDCs. For the
protection domain scope in the static state pattern, we apply a com-
pensation strategy pattern, which is realized using a redundancy
architectural pattern. Rather than implement this as a n-modular
redundancy pattern, we select the forward error correction pattern
to leverage the structure of the matrix and vector variables.
For the variable state in the dynamic state pattern, i.e., the solu-
tion vector, we must select the recovery pattern; any compensation
strategy pattern is not viable due to the dynamic nature of the pro-
tected state and the exorbitant cost of instantiating modular redun-
dancy pattern. The rollback recovery pattern derivative structural
pattern is suitable for this context. This solution entails periodically
preserving the dynamic state pattern to persistent storage, which
incurs an overhead to the application. However, by limiting the
scope of the protection domain to the dynamic state pattern, the
recovery pattern is applied to the solver computation only.
3.2 Patterns for Hard Error (HE) Detection and
Recovery
Parallel implementation of linear solver uses distributed memory
model with message passing to distribute the problem over multiple
processes that run on a number of compute nodes of a HPC system.
In the utilized message passing interface (MPI), a communicator
is a logical collection of processes that can send messages to each
other. The processes use point-to-point or collective primitives
to distribute data, exchange partial results and synchronize. The
occurrence of an unrecoverable error causes MPI calls made by
any process in the communicator to block indefinitely. Most MPI
library implementations cannot stabilize after the failure of any
one process in the communicator, causing the remaining processes
to deadlock, which renders the parallel application incapable of
forward progress.
State Patterns for HE resilience: To enable an MPI-based ap-
plication to survive the occurrence of a hard error, the MPI library
implementation must guarantee that it will stabilize the communi-
cator itself following the process failure caused by the hard error,
and the application must resolve the loss of partial application state
that was resident on the failed process. Therefore, in defining the
scope of the protection domain, we encapsulate the MPI library and
its runtime into an environment state pattern. Much of the variable
state associated with linear solver is distributed by partitioning
the data in a block manner, i.e., row-wise chunks of matrices and
vectors are distributed to processes. When a process failure occurs,
all the variable state associated with process is lost. Accordingly,
we encapsulate the state of each process in the MPI communicator
into dynamic state patterns. In this case, there is no advantage to
encapsulating the individual variables into different state patterns.
Based on such scoping of the MPI-based application’s global state,
the behavioral patterns for resolving the deadlock in the MPI com-
municator following a process failure may be applied separately
from the behavioral patterns that resolve the loss of part of the
solver’s operands, i.e., the solution matrix and vector state.
HE Detection Patterns: For the protection domain scope con-
tained by the environment state pattern, i.e., the MPI communicator,
the detection pattern must determine which processes within a
communicator have failed. The dynamic state does not require an
explicit detection pattern, since any unrecoverable error in the
process state propagates to the environment state pattern.
The failure detection pattern for the the environment state pat-
ternmust be robust, andmay take a proactive or a reactive approach.
Typical detection techniques use periodic signaling to detect the
liveliness of neighboring processes, or by building consensus be-
tween the processes alive. For scalability, failure detection may
also be local, where failure detection is initiated only among the
neighbors of a process. To accomplish detection, we select a con-
sensus structural pattern, which is a derivative of the decentralized
detection strategy pattern. For its implementation, if an applica-
tion requires timely notification of failure to all processes, then a
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proactive approach may involve strategic placement of collective
operations inside the code, such that a failure is detected early on
and costly re-computation is avoided. However, this can lead to
high synchronization overheads, especially if there are no failures.
Another approach is to wait for error notification by a collective
operation in the code, i.e., a reactive approach.
The implementation of the pattern is realizable using the fail-
ure detection primitives offered by the User-Level Failure Miti-
gation (ULFM) [3] implementation of an extended MPI. ULFM
provides primitives such as MPI_COMM_AGREE, MPI_COMM_REVOKE,
MPI_COMM_FAILURE_ACK, and MPI_COMM_FAILURE_GET_ACKED to
facilitate detection. Whereas, notification of failures to other pro-
cesses is propagated through constructs such as MPI_ERR_REVOKED
and MPI_ERR_PROC_FAILED. It should be pointed that use of ULFM
constructs require that MPI application changes the default error
handler MPI_ERRORS_ARE_FATAL.
HE Recovery Patterns: The mitigation of a parallel application
must be concerned with the environment and dynamic state pat-
terns. The mitigation of the environment entails stabilizing the MPI
communicator following the detection of a process failure. While
the dynamic state pattern doesn’t explicitly use a pattern for detec-
tion, its mitigation is critical since it encapsulates part of the parallel
application’s state, which is lost upon occurrence of a failure.
To recreate the failed MPI communicator, the recovery strategy
pattern instantiated as a reconfiguration architectural pattern is
suitable. This pattern may be instantiated using the rejuvenation or
reinitialization structural pattern. An implementation of this pattern
using the ULFM extensions to MPI would use MPI_COMM_SHRINK
primitive to isolate a failed process from the MPI communicator
used by the application. The key benefit of applying this pattern is
that it offers the opportunity to resume the application without the
need to resubmit the job to the scheduler in an HPC system.
The hard error mitigation for the environment state pattern may
also be accomplished by applying the compensation strategy pat-
tern. The instantiation of this pattern substitutes the failed process
with another from a pool of spare processes. The use of this pat-
tern as opposed to rejuvenation pattern eliminates the need to
redistribute the workload among surviving processes which can
be time-consuming and strongly application dependent. Besides,
some HPC applications have strict requirements on the number of
processes due to problem decomposition restrictions or memory
pressure on nodes restricting additional workload.
The compensation pattern can be implemented by spawning
processes at runtime called cold spares or allocating spare processes
during initialization called hot or warm spares depending on how
they are used. Hot spares perform active concurrent execution,
whereas warm spares are initialized and do nothing until a failure
takes place. Warm spares do not maintain any dynamic or static
state until they are put into service. There is also no need to have a
spare for every process, if only a few failures are expected during
the execution of the application. On the other hand, a hot spare is
required for every process in the application to sustain arbitrary
process failures. This is analogous to redundant computation and
does not require the checkpoint pattern for state recovery. However,
processes lost over time result in loss of redundancy. Thus, use of
hot spares can lead to significantly higher overheads and the in-
ability to sustain failures of lost redundant processes as compared
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Figure 1: Checkpoint restart pattern using warm spares.
to an approach based on warm or cold spares. In general, spares
are useful for applications which perform compute-intensive data
distribution plan at the start of the application.
When applying either the rejuvenation or compensation pattern
for mitigation of the environment state pattern, the dynamic state
pattern of the failed process must also be mitigated. Since the com-
plete process state is lost in the event of a failure, a recovery pattern
is appropriate, specifically the checkpoint restart pattern. We use
in-memory checkpointing on a neighbor process to implement the
checkpoint restart pattern, which efficiently leverages point-to-
point communication between compute nodes rather than commit
the checkpoint to a parallel file system [15]. The in-memory check-
pointing is feasible because we have carefully defined the scope of
the state patterns thereby limiting the memory overhead required
for the checkpoints. The use of checkpoint restart pattern with warm
spares strategy to mitigate process failures is illustrated in Figure 1.
4 IMPLEMENTATION OF PATTERN-BASED
MULTIRESILIENCE FOR LINEAR SOLVER
To demonstrate the design of multiresilience solution for a lin-
ear solver application encompassing soft and hard error resilience
patterns, we consider the Generalized minimal residual (GMRES)
method as a case study. We enumerate the design patterns for defin-
ing the protection domain, detection and mitigation patterns for
each error class, and subsequently justify our selections. The suit-
ability of patterns working in combination to provide a holistic
multiresilience solution is an important consideration.
The GMRES method, which underlies many scientific computing
applications, is a Krylov subspace method for the iterative solution
of large sparse non-symmetric linear systems [17]. The flexible GM-
RES extends this solver to permit the pre-conditioner to be changed
every iteration [16] using inner-outer iterations; the “inner" solve
step preconditions the “outer" flexible iteration. The inner-outer
solver structure was leveraged to design Fault Tolerant GMRES
(FT-GMRES) [8] which provides robustness in the presence of un-
bounded errors. The FT-GMRES algorithm is designed to reach
eventual convergence in the presence of soft errors, i.e., the solver
produces a correct outcome at the cost of needing additional it-
erations to arrive at the right answer. It divides the computation
into reliable and unreliable phases, i.e., selective reliability. There is
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Table 1: Design Summary for Multiresilient FT-GMRES solver.
Fault Model PatternClass Choices Selection Reason
Soft Error State Dynamic, static, environment Dynamic Static state corruption is detectable, environmentcorruption transforms to process failure
Detection Monotonicity, bounded compute, checksums Bounded compute About 14 times lower overhead compared to mono-tonicity pattern
Recovery Solver state: restart inner, abort inner & restart outer Restart inner Low detection latency
Variable state: checkpoint, checksums Checkpoint Less computational overhead
Hard Error State Dynamic, static, environment Dynamic, static, environment Process failures are fatal for application
Detection Proactive, reactive Proactive Low overhead & collective in every iteration
Recovery Solver state: restart inner, abort inner & restart outer Abort inner & restart outer Checkpoint state of outer
MPI environment: cold/warm spares, rejuvenate Warm spares Workload distribution
Variable state: checkpoint-restart, diskless check-
point, interpolation Checkpoint-restart Less computational overhead
no assumption of reliability in the inner solver, i.e., it may return
incorrect results as long as the solution is completed in finite time.
On the other hand, the outer solver needs to be reliable, which
is feasible since most of the time is spent in the inner solver. The
outer solver can also detect invalid values within the solution vector
and replace them with arbitrary values for forward progress of the
solver. The flexible inner-outer iterations have the property that
the dimension of the Krylov subspace grows at each outer iteration,
which guarantees eventual convergence.
Implementation of SDC Detection and Recovery Patterns
We resolved to applying the monitoring structural pattern for detec-
tion of SDCs. The pattern implementation entails defining bounds
on values produced during critical computational phases of GMRES.
Specifically, an orthogonalization process based on the Arnoldi
method is utilized to find orthonormal basis of the Krylov sub-
space [17]. The basis is used to approximate the solution at each
iteration of the solver. The projections produced during this critical
computational phase are bounded by the upper bound of Frobe-
nius norm of the input matrix. In a parallel implementation, the
comparison of the projection length with the Frobenius norm is
performed locally. This pattern implementation is referred to as the
bounded compute pattern. An alternate algorithmic implementation
of this pattern is possible using a monotonicity violation check.
This implementation uses sparse matrix-vector multiplication (Sp-
MVM) for calculating residue. While more generally applicable, it
incurs as much as 14 times higher overhead in comparison to the
implementation based on bounded compute pattern.
For implementing the recovery pattern for SDCs, we use an in-
stantiation of the rollback pattern. When applying this pattern, we
leverage the inner-outer solver structure that expects high relia-
bility from only the outer solver phases by scoping the rollback
recovery pattern to exclude the inner solver phase. Our implemen-
tation creates local in-memory checkpoints.
Implementation of HE Detection andMitigation Patterns
Hard errors in an MPI-based implementation of the GMRES solver
causes failure of the affected MPI process. For implementing the
process failure detection and mitigation patterns, we embed ULFM
primitives in the GMRES solver implementation.
For detection of process failure within the MPI communicator,
we leverage the collective SpMVM operations performed in every
iteration of the GMRES solver. Detection is done using the returned
error codes from MPI collective operations, which are caught by
the error handler for the MPI communicator. Since no additional
application code is required, the overhead of the detection pattern’s
implementation is negligible. For the mitigation of process failures,
we implement a compensation strategy pattern, which instantiates
a redundancy pattern. The implementation entails the creation of
a pool of spare processes, which replace the failed ranks in the
communicator; this implementation avoids the need to redistribute
workload. For the recovery of the dynamic application state after a
failure, we consider an algorithm-based compensation pattern that
uses linear interpolation of known correct values to mitigate the
affected state. While this method has no overhead during error-free
operation, it causes slower convergence of the solver. Therefore, in
our solution we apply the rollback recovery pattern for the static
and dynamic state recovery after process failures. Its implementa-
tion creates in-memory checkpoints on neighboring processes.
ImplementingMultiresilience Solution for FT-GMRES Ta-
ble 1 summarizes our design choices for supporting multiresilience
in FT-GMRES solver, describing the various resilience patterns
considered for each fault model, the patterns selected for our mul-
tiresilience solution as well as the justification for their selection.
Based on our empirical evaluation, we select algorithm-based in-
stantiations of the patterns for SDC detection and recovery since
they incur low performance overheads. However, the coverage of
these pattern instances risks the possibility of prolonged execution
on account of additional solver iterations. The selection of rollback
pattern for state recovery while handling process failures uninten-
tionally causes the SDC detection pattern to be invoked more often
than intended by the application programmer during re-execution
after rollback. However, interaction of the rollback pattern with
the SDC detection pattern limits propagation of SDC by preventing
incorrect state from being captured during checkpointing.
5 EXPERIMENTAL SETUP AND EVALUATION
The FT-GMRES is implemented using the Trilinos 12.6.4 frame-
work [7] and uses the Tpetra package for parallel linear algebra
operations such as SpMVM, vector dot products, etc. We use ULFM
release 1.1, which is derived fromOpenMPI-1.7.1, for process failure
detection, notification, and rebuilding failed communicators.
Test problem and configuration: We solve a linear problem gener-
ated by discretizing a regular 3-D mesh using the Intrepid package 1
in Trilinos framework. The generated sparse matrix has 6,967,871
1https://trilinos.org/packages/intrepid/
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rows and 186,169,411 non-zero elements. We use the same prob-
lem size while scaling the number of processes, which causes the
size of per-process checkpoint to shrink with increasing process
counts. We fix the number of iterations of the inner solver of the
FT-GMRES to 25, and number of iterations of the outer solver to 20
for a maximum iteration count of 500.
Evaluation platform: We use a Linux cluster with 40 compute
nodes interconnected with a dual-bonded 1 Gbps Ethernet. Each
compute node has two AMDOpteron processors (a total of 24 cores)
and 64 GB memory, for a total of 960 processor cores. The switches
support fully non-blocking point-to-point bandwidth of 215 MB/s.
We perform our fault injection experiments with 32, 64, 128, 256,
and 512 processes, which are distributed across nodes of the cluster.
The spare processes created by hard error recovery pattern instance
are mapped to the last physical node. We maintain the same process
mapping for all experiments to prevent application performance
variability due to mapping.
Soft error injection: The errors are injected at fixed intervals after
every 10, 20, or 30 SpMVM operations. We randomly corrupt data
elements produced after the completion of a SpMVM operation.
These fault rates are chosen to understand the interaction with
process failure resilience patterns; injecting a soft error after every
10 SpMVM operations means that the checkpointed dynamic state
is affected more often than the injection after every 30 SpMVMs.
Process failure injection: To simulate hard errors and for repro-
ducibility of results, the rank positions of MPI processes to be termi-
nated are pre-selected. We also guarantee that the failed processes
are on different physical nodes than the ones on which spare pro-
cesses are mapped, and that sufficient spares are always available.
Following these constraints, the processes are terminated randomly
based on an exponential distribution with an average failure rate
corresponding to time to complete at least 75 iterations. Under this
assumption and based on Young’s formulation, the checkpoint of
dynamic state is performed at every iteration of the outer solver or
after 25 iterations. While other analytical models for estimating the
checkpoint interval are available based on failure distributions [1],
we found our assumptions to be adequate for this work based on
observed failure trends in current HPC systems.
6 RESULTS
The experiments are designed to analyze the reliability and perfor-
mance characteristics of individual patterns. We therefore evaluate
the performance overheads of the patterns with different error
rates and process counts. In each case, enough experiments are
performed such that standard deviation is low. For instance, the
coefficient of variation for all cases range between 0.01 and 0.15.
The main motivation for these experiments is to assess the ac-
curacy with which we can estimate the performance overhead for
multiresilience solution from stand-alone soft error and hard error
resilience experiments. This provides feasibility and constraints of
various combination of patterns by analyzing their performance
and resilience impact on the application.
6.1 Soft Error (SE) Resilience
The performance impact with three different soft error injection
rates is quantified in Figure 2. The y-axis shows the overhead on
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Figure 2: Overheads of SE resilience with error injection af-
ter every 30 SpMVM, 20 SpMVM, and 10 SpMVM operations.
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Figure 3: Overheads of PF resilience with up to four process
failures using checkpoint restart pattern and warm spares.
time-to-solution of providing resilience to errors, which includes
the overheads of including detection and recovery patterns. In all
cases, solver converged to a correct solution in the allotted time.
The soft error rates are chosen such that every inner solve oper-
ation is corrupted multiple times (10 SpMVM) or once (20 SpMVM),
or after every other inner solve operation (30 SpMVM). Results
indicate that high SDC rate leads to higher overheads across all
processor counts. The prime factor is the slower convergence of
the solver in presence of more errors. The breakdown of overheads
with two extreme error rates is listed in Table 2. The average num-
ber of extra iterations, represented as Nextra , consumed with error
rate of 10 SpMVM is always higher than at 30 SpMVM. Mostly,
the overhead due to extra computation is higher than the com-
bined overheads of detection and recovery, which are represented
as tSDC−d and tSDC−r , respectively. On the other hand, the SDC
detection and recovery overheads tend to decrease with scale.
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Table 2: Breakdown of overheads related to SE resilience as
a percentage of total time to solution.
Processes tSDC−d + tSDC−r Nextra [max]
30 SpMVM 10 SpMVM 30 SpMVM 10 SpMVM
32 2.06% 8.91% 30.1 [75] 35.5 [150]
64 6.45% 4.75% 26.9 [50] 33.7 [75]
128 8.10% 8.75% 25 [25] 32.5 [125]
256 1.07% 1.94% 32 [50] 35.6 [125]
512 0.69% 0.72% 28.3 [50] 34.6 [100]
Table 3: Breakdown of overheads related to PF resilience as
a percentage of total time to solution.
Processes tPF−x tPF−r tcheck [% dynamic] tr ecompute
32 0.02% 17.1% 28.1% [25.6%] 10.9%
64 0.03% 9.4% 18.5% [22.9%] 13.4%
128 0.04% 5.4% 12.9% [14.7%] 12.9%
256 0.02% 1.9% 7.5% [16.7%] 13.5%
512 0.05% 1.2% 5.1% [12.2%] 16.2%
The results indicate a tradeoff between SDC detection overhead
and the extra computation overhead. The use of monotonicity vio-
lation for SDC detection causes high overhead, but the number of
extra iterations needed for convergence tends to decrease in com-
parison to detection based on the bounded computation pattern.
Overall, the utilized combination of SDC detection and recovery
patterns results in minimum time to solution for FT-GMRES solver
while providing resilience to soft errors.
6.2 Hard Error (HE) Resilience
The performance impact of process failure resilience through check-
point restart pattern and spare processes is quantified in Figure 3.
The overheads of checkpointing application state are indicative
from ‘Fault-Free with Checkpoints’ bar in Figure 3, where no pro-
cess failures are injected. This includes the overheads to perform
initial checkpoint of static state and multiple checkpoints of dy-
namic state. These overheads tend to decrease with increasing
number of processes, since the problem size is kept constant. On
average, the overheads range between 6.28% to 1.98%.
The overheads of providing mitigation to process failures are in-
dicated from ‘Checkpoint Restart Recovery’ bar in Figure 3, where
up to four independent process failures are injected based on the
selected failure rate. Significant overheads are notable at lower
processor counts, while overheads tend to decrease at higher pro-
cessor counts. These overheads include the following components:
re-computation time, tr ecompute , time to recover dynamic and
static states using checkpoints, tPF−r , time to fix MPI environment
and include spares, tPF−x , and the time to perform checkpoint of
dynamic and static states, tcheck .
Our analysis indicates that time to fix the distributed environ-
ment tends to be negligible, e.g., it varies between 0.02% to 0.05% of
the total time to solution at our scale of experiments. The dominant
overheads are due to the following: tPF−r , tcheck and tr ecompute .
These overheads tend to be additive with the number of failures,
whereas tcheck can be controlled via selection of checkpoint inter-
val. The average values of these parameters are listed in Table 3.
The checkpoint related overheads tend to decrease with scale from
as high as 45% at 32 processes to as low as 6% at 512 processes, since
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Figure 4: Comparison of normalized times in case of mul-
tiresilience solution with estimated times from stand-alone
PF resilience and SE resilience experiments.
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Figure 5: Comparison of average checkpoint times between
PF resilience and multiresilience solutions.
the workload is kept constant. The recovery overhead is mostly
consumed by the time to deliver application state to the spare pro-
cess which is put in service, i.e., communication of the spare with
the neighbor of the failed process (see Figure 1). Further investiga-
tion shows that significantly more time is spent in restoring static
state as compared to dynamic state, which emphasizes the need to
carefully scope the static and dynamic state patterns.
6.3 Multiresilience Solution
The performance impact of using the proposed multiresilience solu-
tion is quantified in Figure 4. In this figure, we also plot an estimate
of the time-to-solution (patterned bars) obtained via results from
standalone SE and PF resilience experiments. The overheads for
multiresilience solution tend to decrease with scale in line with
the results obtained from PF experiments. The observed minute
discrepancies between estimated and actual times is due to the
interaction between PF and SE resilience patterns which is not
captured in stand-alone PF experiments. Results in Figure 5 indi-
cate higher average and standard deviation of checkpoint times
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in multiresilience experiments as compared to stand-alone PF ex-
periments. The higher checkpoint times are primarily due to extra
iterations in multiresilience experiments as a result of SDCs (see
Table 2) causing more checkpoints to be performed.
In our experiments, we are able to achieve decent overall per-
formance estimates for multiresilience solution using stand-alone
experiments for two reasons: 1) the cost of performing extra check-
points of dynamic state due to SDCs is significantly low (see %
dynamic state in checkpoint overhead from Table 3), 2) the addi-
tional time to converge to a solution in presence of SDCs is less
than the expected time of process failure, preventing accumulation
of additional overheads as a result of process failure. This demon-
strates that the careful selection of resilience patterns can alleviate
some of the complications associated with design of multiresilience
solutions for HPC applications. However, in general, it is important
to consider the interactions between different resilience patterns.
7 RELATEDWORK
There have been numerous proposals for resilience solutions that
attempt to solve the challenge at different layers of the system stack.
To deal with memory errors, HPC systems use memory modules
with error correcting codes (ECC). Algorithm specific schemes, such
as algorithm-based fault tolerance (ABFT) apply row and column
checksum encoding on dense matrix structures [9], or use the diag-
onal, banded diagonal, block diagonal structures of sparse problems
[18] for application-level detection and correction of errors. The
design of solutions that combine capabilities across different layers
of the system stack has also been previously explored, but using
ad-hoc methods. For example, using the ABFT technique to protect
application data structures permits different ECC mechanisms for
different page frames in memory [13]. To deal with fail-stop and
silent errors simultaneously, recent work has proposed combining
ABFT methods with system-based checkpointing [2], in which each
computational phase is followed by ABFT verification for SDCs and
an in-memory checkpoint. This approach has also been shown to
facilitate roll-forward recovery for conjugate gradient solvers [5].
Design patterns have been extensively used in software engi-
neering, particularly in the context of object-oriented (OO) pro-
gramming [6]. Patterns in this context define class interfaces and
inheritance hierarchies, and help establish key relationships among
the classes. For parallel software design, there have been efforts
to codify the various parallel computation and communication
structures into a pattern catalog [14]. The Our Pattern Language
(OPL) [12] supports the design and implementation of a parallel
algorithm by linking the various parallel design patterns. To the
best of our knowledge, this work is the first demonstration of ap-
plying resilience design patterns for modeling and implementation
of multiresilience solutions.
8 CONCLUSION
A pattern-oriented approach to the design and implementation of
a multiresilience solution is described in this paper. We leveraged
resilience design patterns to systematically identify and evaluate
the appropriate detection and mitigation techniques for two very
different fault models: soft errors that cause silent data corruptions
and fail-stop failures. We demonstrated the development of a mul-
tiresilience solution and presented the experimental evaluation for
an iterative linear solver application using algorithm-based pattern
instances together with patterns realized using ULFM extensions to
MPI. The broader impact of this work is two fold: it demonstrates a
structured model-based approach to identifying alternative patterns
for detection, containment and mitigation of specific types of errors,
and it facilitates the development of roadmaps for architecting mul-
tiresilience solutions by composing patterns from multiple layers of
the system stack and iteratively refining the pattern relationships
to optimize end-to-end application performance.
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